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PART II.
We next find before the bar of the Supreme Court that pict-
uresque and always interesting character, Aaron Burr. The
story of Burr is a melancholy episode in our history, quite
familiar in its details. Aaron Burr was a man of unusual
parts, a man of broad culture, and a man of profound influence
in his day and generation. That he who had held the second
honor in the land, should be a subject for the rigor of that
clause in the Constitution which says that "Treason against
the United States shall consist only in levying war against
them or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort," was most unprecedented in history. It is well
that this law is so clear and unsusceptible to variation of con-
struction. The court for the first time expounded this truth,
and drew the line between actual war and a conspiracy to
precipitate war with treasonable intent. In this memorable
case Burr was his own best counsel, although there were two
of the first minds in the profession engaged. Burr was a brief
speaker, but adroit and thorough. In his trial he rose almost
superior to himself, so calm, so respectful, yet self-reliant and
skillful. A man worthy of the magnitude of his alleged
dream of conquest and power. The case simmered down to
a question of evidence, whether collateral testimony was
admissible to show that Burr, though hundreds of miles away,
was, nevertheless, connected with the objectionable transactions
on the Ohio River at Blennerhasset.
The court held such evidence irrelevant, and in the words.
of the eloquent Wirt, Marshall stepped in between Burr and
death. This result was not satisfactory to either side. A
technicality seemed to have averted punishment, or defeated
vindication. The cloud, unlifted, shadowed the subsequent
career of Burr, but seems not to have shortened his days; ie
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lived until 1836 when, at the age of eighty-five, he died on
Staten Island, practically alone. If this unfortunate man was
innocent, it is a pity the judgment of the court should have
been denied in confirmation of the fact. It has been thought
the court lacked moral courage, and waived the final issue, but
the record of those superb jurists will hardly support such a
view. The court was now about to enter upon its- noontide
course. Mr. Justice Joseph Story, the jurist historian, at the
age of thirty-two, succeeded to the Supreme Bench in place of
Justice Cushing who had died. The death of Justice Chase
had deprived the court of another of its early lights and his
successor was Gabriel Duval, of Maryland, appointed by
President Madison, a man of sterling morality but hardly
equal to the superb Story, with whom his Supreme Court
labors were begun.
The court was quite even at this time, all the way through.
The Chief Justice was decidedly the dominating spirit, but his
coadjutors were all men of strength and integrity, and were
worthy to preside in the presence of that illustrious bar,
composed of men of the highest talent and luminous ability,
the like of which has probably never since flourished in this
country. It was at this time that William Pinckney returned
from his mission to Europe, and became Madison's Attorney-
General. He was an international lawyer, both of experience
and of natural talent, and the character of the law then under
consideration, that concerning prize and admiralty causes, was
so happily suitable to his education as to open a career
unexcelled in brilliancy by the record of any member of the
American Bar. With this legal Ajax, to use the word of
Story, stood Horace Binney and Luther Martin, Daniel
Webster, William Wirt, Henry Clay and a score of others
whose labors have so justly illuminated the Bar of the United
States.
To one of these must be paid, at least, a passing tribute,
passing, because I dare not dwell too long in the presence of
such inspiring worth, yet, with this pattern of intellectual man-
hood, with one who in his prime was cast an exile upon a foreign
shore, who, amid affliction and sorrow, made proud his asylum
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-with such it is well that the present generation should still
be familiar-if only in name; this was the mighty Emmett
who distinguished himself in the famous case of the
Nereide.
That such as these should live and die, leaving in their
wake no trace more enduring than that left by the effulgent
comet which darts meteorically from beneath the horizon, is
one of the most melancholy incidents of ephemeral human
effort.
Such is the fate of all forensic genius. As William Wirt
remarked, in speaking of this subject, "What should we have
known of Hortensius but for Cicero." Which remark brings
us back to the consideration of the great jurist writer, Story,
from whose tireless pen flowed the accumulated erudition of
years of ceaseless toil. No wonder, when the vastness of
his range is considered, that some of his work should show
imperfection. Opinions, reviews, text-books and various
other productions covered a prodigious field, and if there
was an impatience of minute accuracy apparent in one
work, it was made up by the valuable contribution in another.
Criticism has been advanced both favorably and otherwise,
which is a condition not to be looked upon as in the least
disparaging to Story, but is an evidence of a healthy intel-
lectual watchfulness, and if some one has found the few
flaws in the vast fabric, so much the better for us, and this is
not to be looked upon as remarkable when so much ground
was covered in one triumphant march.
Story was a New England man, a Democrat, and, from his
earliest professional days, a man of ardent industry. He was
born in I779 of distinguished parentage, and was graduated
from Harvard in 1798. It is a point worthy of note to observe
how, among very unfavorable political surroundings, he rose
to a position in society of prominence early in life. The law
reports are full of his notes, and his text-books are standard
works that will probably be authorities for many generations to
come. Of all the American jurists he is the one who was most
familiarly known. He had wide correspondence and innum-
erable acquaintance, which may or may not have been the
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consequence of his mental pursuits and, perhaps, was due to
an agreeable personality.
At times this man outdid his superior in the preparation of
his learned opinions. He produced, on the occasion of the
Dartmouth College Case, an opinion which was a masterpiece
in its analogies and logical conclusion. Not but that Marshall's
views were equally complete, but they were brifancd~inpefiaus,
for this reason.
The masterful decree of the Federalist needed no appeal to
the reasoning of the multitude, but the Democratic Story
would share the premises of his judgments with the whole
world.
The states, in this case, suffered another blow, and again in
the later case of the Insolvent Act of New York, where both
retrospective and prospective laws were included in the dis-
cussion. The Chief Justice and two of his court dissented
from the general opinion, believing that the Constitution
covered both classes of law. This dignified custodian of the
rights of the American people had next a very delicate ques-
tion in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, a singular and
wonderfully important constitutional question. The State of
Maryland had proceeded to tax a Federal institution, a branch
of the United States Bank. When the National Government
declared this act void, the State of Maryland declared the
United States Act chartering the bank void. The arguments
in this case were unusually full, there being an extra counsel
on each side. Mr. Pinckney occupied three days in his dis-
cussion. In this case the spirit of the court came out in very
plain terms. The Chief Justice sealed the Federalistic prin-
ciples of the judiciary in these words. In speaking of the
Federal powers of the government, he said: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
the end, whick are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." With such
views as these do we wonder that this one of our several
departments of government has outstripped all others in the
race for supremacy-this view in the presence of the ioth
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article of the Constitution, which says, "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor pro-
hibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respec-
tively or to the people." This renders the scope of the
powers, so far as the end is concerned, quite a delegated and
limited power. Yet, following the view of the court, we find
that the means are not within the limits prescribed for the
ends, and the powers of government for adopting means in
carrying out delegated ends, cease to be the circumscribed
variety of powers characteristic of a government of delegated
powers. Any legitimate means not prohibited are legal. This
is a broad view. All that is not delegated as to actual powers
of government belong to the states or the people. All that is
not prohibited as to the means necessary to carry out these
powers of government belong to the Federal government, and
it is not for the people or the states to question such means,
provided they are consistent in the eyes of the Federal judiciary
with the powers delegated. Such a means was a bank, and
its legality was fixed.
To determine on what ground the decision of the court
must rest, and what the proper view of the court should be as
to the states' rights in taxing national banks, was a difficult
task. So far the states' taxing power was unlimited, it was
one of the prerogatives of sovereignty that had never been
delegated. What was to prevent this unrestrained force from
extinguishing any or all of our institutions, national or other-
wise? At a later period it was demonstrated how easily the
state banks could be wound up by a judicious exercise of the
taxing power in the hands of the United States, and it was to
prevent such results that this case proceeded to declare the
limits to this state sovereignty, without the semblance of a
constitutional provision, save such as must constructively be
recognized ere the nationality of our Union be undermined.
Marshall perceived all this and acted accordingly, and, follow-
ing the advantage thus gained, we can imagine the United
States exercising the very power denied the states, to the
extermination of every vestige of a state institution, so long
as the Republican form of government be unimpaired. So
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far the important rulings had been made while interpreting
the letter of the Constitution, but this time a vast slice had
been taken from the states' rights, by a judgment based on the
spirit of the law only.
In 1812, the death of Justice Livingston made vacant the
seat about to be occupied by Smith Thompson. This man,
born and bred in the atmosphere of astute and learned
lawyers, was destined to figure at the bar of New York when
it was adorned with the most cultivated and brilliant talent
that has ever been the boast of any state. From among these
lights he was elevated to the State Supreme bench where he
sat for seventeen years. His promotion to the United States
Supreme Court, which occured after he had been Chief Justice
of New York and Secretary of the Navy, found him eminently
well fitted to be associated with those who were engaged in
constructing a nation. Justice Trimble, who succeeded Todd
in 1826, was also a man of unusual ability, and he, too, might
have been Chief Justice of Kentucky, as Thompson had been
of New York, had he not twice refused the honor. His regard
for the National Judiciary, however, would not allow him to
refuse a district judgeship, from which, nine years later, he
rose tb the highest court. His promising services were cut
short after a very brief time, and he was followed by John
McLean, of Ohio.
The court entered, in 1824, upon a series of decisions in
regard to the infringement on the part of the states' legislation
of some of the powers expressly granted to the Congress.
These were cases of interstate and foreign commerce. Neces-
sarily these decisions were Federal, and it is only consistent to
suppose that the subsequent cases permitting the states to
,exercise authority in instances where no national law has been
passed, or where they fail to reach, would not have resulted
as they did had not the complexion of the Supreme Court
been reversed.
The next decision adding a link to the chain of Federal
development was pronounced against the State of Missouri,
which had been summoned to the bar of the United States
Court to answer for having emitted bills of credit. This state
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proposed to set up a loan office where certificates were issued
in small denominations secured on certain public lands. Had
this been a loan pure and simple, it would have been a legiti-
mate proceeding, but the Supreme Court, reversing the State
tribunal, decided that the certificates were bills of credit, and
illegal.
It was never attempted to deny to the states the right to
expound their own constitutional and legislative acts, nor did
the Supreme Court, during the days of this memorable in-
cumbency, arrogate common law jurisdiction, but so far as
the spirit or letter of the supreme Federal law would permit,
and wherever the jealous watchfulness of the judiciary could
perceive, nothing was lost that might serve as a stone in the
bulwark of Federal centralization, and the component states
were met on every occasion where there was the slightest
possibility of their assuming a privilege dangerous to the
nationality.
Towards the end of this period of Marshall and his court,
there were two more changes in the personnel of the bench.
Justice Washington completed thirty years of continuous labor
and almost accomplished as long a career as Marshall. He
was followed by Henry Baldwin, of Pennsylvania, who, like
Justice Wayne, belonged more to the period of Democratic
Taney than to this session of centralization. Wayne succeeded
to the bench on the death of Justice Johnson, and thus an
entirely new bench replaced the one which was sitting in the
early days when Marshal commenced his long and arduous
course. Although some of these pioneers had struggled long,
ere their days were done, their vigorous chief saw them one
by one gathered to their reward, and after the complete re-
newal of the court, and another generation had commenced,
he lay down his burden of eighty years with his mental
powers unimpaired and his personal influence still dominant.
The court that followed under the learned lead of Taney
was Democratic in its tendencies, but the bark of Fedralism
was too far advanced on her course to be overhauled, and the
subsequent turn of events only combined to speed her course.
It was a bold stroke completed, and while easy to-day to
IN THE UNITED STATES.
realize the necessity of a strong national court, when the light
has been turned on by the artistic hand of the master spirit
Marshall, yet how many can appreciate how difficult was
the task of initiating the people in the first principles of
Federal judicial power?
This court striding boldly through the new forest of national
complications, struck down the giant trees with the same ease
as it swept aside the entangling underbrush of smaller
difficulties. They had cleared up the question of implied, as
well as expressed powers of Congress; they had checked the
legislatures of the states in their efforts to control Federal
powers; to tax Federal agencies; to emit bills of credit; inter-
fere or regulate commerce, among themselves or with Foreign
Nations; they had rebuked the defiance on the part of the
state judiciaries of their own decrees and had set up the
supremacy of the National Government in the right to tax, to
establish banking systems, and to pre-eminence and preference
in payment of debts of creditors. The Legislature of the
nation had likewise met its Master in the indomitable
Marshall, nor was the Executive exempt, although that
department was incumbered at times by the most opposing
influences backed by such sturdy dispositions as those of
Jefferson and Jackson. Not one step, however, was added to
the power to take the initiative, and the case of Worcester v.
Georgia, shows how a recalcitrant defendant was free from any
other than moral suasion. Enough, however, had been
accomplished and the power which was left by this remarkable
court as a heritage to those who have come after it, is at once
an incalculably valuable and tremendously dangerous trust.
With such a pure, learned and able judiciary, as that with
which the United States has heretofore been blessed, power is
our prosperity, advancement and happiness; but let corrup-
tion creep beneath this ermine mantle and we are lost.
Weakness, ignorance or vice, clad in the raiment of such a
stupendous power, would precipitate poverty, deterioration
and sorrow, withering our nationality like a blast from the
infernal. As has been said, the National Judiciary has been
constitutionally lifted aloof from the fickle and ephemeral
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fancies of the populace, but this advantage is not without its
accompanying danger.
It is not always well that the people should be denied a
quick and prompt opportunity of ridding themselves of an
unworthy servant. That it is impossible to deceive the entire
multitude at all times is the secret of the superiority of
popular government, and it is often well that the general
voice should be heard. The Supreme Court is far from this
voice, and it is to be hoped that the noble past will be emu-
lated in the future, and there will be no necessity to fetter our
independent judiciary with the heavy political chains that bind
the every movement of the servants of the state in the other
departments. The Supreme Court to-day, while doubtless not
so imposing as in its " Golden Age," is not one degree less
respected nor less worthy of the confidence of the people. Its
decisions are fraught with finer distinctions, and where its
predecessor had but to gather in the first abundant fruits, our
contemporary judges have to glean what is left after a century
of litigation. The acute intellect of the modern jurist has a
more onerous task, protecting the rights of this greater nation,
than was imposed upon those who formulated the fundamental
principle under which this generation has found prosperity,
hence it is well that we scrutinize fastidiously the nominations
of our Chief Magistrate, and it behooves the advising Senator
to look diligently before he concur in the appointment of a
Justice of the Supreme Court.
Thomas Kilby Smith.
Philadelphia, September, x898.
